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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article explores the issue of key employee compensation
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Section II first looks at the
history of key employee retention plans before analyzing recent
legislative changes that have curtailed the effectiveness of such
plans. Section III analyzes the new legislation and the changes it
has made to key employee compensation motions in bankruptcy.
Finally, Section IV offers recommendations for changes to the
current statutes and other ways to halt unjustifiably large bonuses
being paid to employees of bankrupt corporations.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Way We Were: Employee Bonuses Before 2005
1

Executive compensation is a hot topic in American politics.
The subject has recently been in the news due to the current
2
Executive bonuses, especially, have been
unstable economy.
3
sharply examined in the media.
It is not, however, merely a recent bone of contention in
Washington, D.C., or around the country. Congress first tackled
the issue in a failed piece of legislation: the Employee Abuse
4
That bill was intended to “protect
Prevention Act of 2002.
employees and retirees from corporate practices that deprive them
of their earnings and retirement savings when a business files for
5
bankruptcy.” It was not until 2005, however, and the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”) that Congress finally passed legislation tackling the
issue of executive compensation in the context of business
6
bankruptcies.
What was the problem Congress was attempting to fix? Pre7
BAPCPA, Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession often filed motions
seeking court approval of a “key employee retention program”
8
(“KERP”).

1. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, In Bailout Furor, Wall Street Pay Becomes a Target, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A1. For example, the New York Times online has a “Times
Topics” section dedicated solely to executive compensation issues. See Times
Topics: Executive Pay, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=executive%20compensatio&
st=cse (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Times Topics].
2. See Times Topics, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Royal Pay at Delphi, Reined in by a Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at BU.
4. Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong.
(2002).
5. Id.
6. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
7. A debtor-in-possession is a special creation of Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006). A debtor-in-possession is the
debtor, but is also vested with the rights and powers of a trustee in bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006); see also Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp., 712 F.2d
962, 965 (5th Cir. 1983). A full discussion of these rights and the related duties of
a trustee or debtor-in-possession is outside the scope of this article.
8. See infra Part II.A.4.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6

2009]

1.

NO REST FOR CONGRESS, NO MORE FOR EXECS

1197

What Is a KERP?

A key employee retention plan is just that—a means for a
company undergoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings to retain
9
important members of its management structure. A KERP usually
included “lump-sum retention payments to employees who remain
10
employed by the debtor through a particular date,” along with
possible bonus payments and/or severance payments due upon
11
involuntary termination. These plans were usually offered to the
12
debtor’s executive officers and senior management.
2.

The Purpose of KERPs

Many arguments were put forward to justify the use of KERPs
in retaining key employees. The most common of these was the
need to persuade employees to stick with a company undergoing
13
the unsteady process of bankruptcy reorganization. In addition,
debtors often argued that the cost of hiring and training new
employees would cost more than using bonuses to persuade
14
current employees to remain on the job. Notions of equity were
also argued—employees should earn a bonus “for their hard work
15
Finally, debtors argued that
and dedication to the business.”
certain employees were just too important to the management
structure and needed to be retained in order to promote continuity
16
and preserve the value of the business as a whole.

9. Paul R. Hage, Key Employee Retention Plans Under BAPCPA: Is There Anything
Left?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 Art. 4, Part I.B.2 (2008).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at Part I.B.1. See also A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving Employee
Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 93, 98 (2003). See also In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2001) (summarizing the benefits to the company achieved by retaining important
employees). For a list of common arguments in favor of KERPs and a critique of
these arguments, see Robert J. Keach, Seventh Annual Great Debates: Resolved:
Incentive and Retention Programs Should Be Banned, Am. Bankr. Inst., Part III, Apr. 10,
2003.
14. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98; see also Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 79 (describing
costs associated with headhunters and recruitment of new employees).
15. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98.
16. Id. at 99; see also Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 81–82 (finding that employees
eligible for the retention payments were necessary for the successful
reorganization of the company).
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All of these arguments rest on the underlying objective of a
bankruptcy reorganization—to maximize the value of the estate or
the business so that creditors can recoup the greatest amount
17
By retaining key employees, the
possible from the debtor.
business can continue to operate and can implement the
18
reorganization process more quickly and efficiently.
3.

The Statutory Authority and Standards for KERPs

KERPs are mentioned nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code.
However, “[p]rior to BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts generally agreed
that KERPs were an important tool in the Chapter 11 rehabilitative
19
process.” The court’s power in approving KERPs arises through
two bankruptcy code provisions: sections 105 and 363. Section 105
provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
20
provisions of this title.” This section grants very broad power to
the bankruptcy court.
Section 363 governs the use, sale, or lease of the debtor’s
21
property after the debtor has entered bankruptcy. Section 363
authorizes the debtor-in-possession, with the court’s approval, to
“use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
22
property of the estate.” Because KERP payments were not normal
payments made to the debtor’s employees, court approval of the
KERP was necessary.
In approving any use of the debtor’s property outside the
ordinary course of business, the bankruptcy court will apply the
23
“In evaluating whether a sound
“business judgment rule.”
business purpose justifies the use, sale or lease of property under
Section 363(b), courts consider a variety of factors, which

17. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 8 B.R. 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (“The
purpose of bankruptcy is to provide an equal opportunity for all creditors to share
in the assets of the debtor available for distribution.”).
18. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 99. Dickerson cites to both Aerovox, 269 B.R.
at 82, and In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1999), as examples of cases where certain employees were found to be
essential to the successful reorganization of the debtor.
19. Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
21. Id. § 363 (2006).
22. § 363(b)(1).
23. Montgomery Ward, 242 B.R. at 153; Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3.
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24

essentially represent a ‘business judgment test.’”
This business
judgment test is not a rigid set of guidelines; rather it is a weighing
25
of certain factors and the circumstances of the case. The business
judgment test usually focuses on whether “the debtor exercised
proper business judgment in formulating the program, i.e.,
26
whether a sound business practice justifies the request,” and
27
“whether the proposed program is fair and reasonable.” This test,
however, is not a difficult one for the debtor to pass. As the court
stated in In re Aerovox, Inc., “a debtor’s business decision ‘should be
approved by the court unless it is shown to be so manifestly
unreasonable that it could not be based upon sound business
28
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.’” As one
commentator has pointed out, this threshold is relatively low and
weighted heavily in the debtor’s favor:
[D]ebtor-proposed KERPS will be approved if the debtor
demonstrates (through evidence) that the KERP
constitutes a proper exercise of sound business judgment
and the KERP is “fair and reasonable under the
circumstances.” Significant deference is paid to the
debtor’s business judgment, despite the obvious interest
of senior management in achieving approval of the
29
KERP.
4.

Examples of KERPs in Action

In order to study the changes BAPCPA made in the
implementation of KERPs, it is important to understand previous
KERP iterations prior to BAPCPA. The four cases described below
demonstrate the court’s role in approving, modifying, and denying

24. Montgomery Ward, 242 B.R. at 153.
25. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80–81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); Montgomery
Ward, 242 B.R. at 154. The Second Circuit emphasized the need to weigh the
circumstances by declaring that:
In fashioning its findings, a bankruptcy judge must not blindly follow the
hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, he should
consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly,
act to further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity
holders, alike.
In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
26. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98.
27. Id.
28. Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 80 (citing In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (additional citations omitted)).
29. Keach, supra note 13, at Part II.
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proposed KERPs prior to the enactment of BAPCPA.
a.

In re Geneva Steel Co.

30

Geneva Steel Company sought approval of a retention
31
program for six of its senior executives and thirty managers. The
plan consisted of a severance plan for the six senior executives and
a bonus payable to the executives and the managers upon
32
The severance plan paid the
emergence from bankruptcy.
executives six months’ salary if they were terminated prior to the
33
“substantial consummation of a plan of reorganization,” or nine
months’ salary if the executives were terminated within ninety days
34
of plan consummation. The bonus plan entitled the executives to
a payment of 50% of their annual salary upon plan confirmation
and gave the managers a discretionary bonus of up to 25% of their
35
annual salary.
When the court addressed Geneva’s motion for approval, it
expressed disapproval that Geneva had neither sought nor
36
obtained the approval of the Steelworkers Union. “Management
may appropriately reserve decisions on executive benefits to itself
and its directors when all is well, but when the continued existence
of the business is in question and the executive benefits are subject
to court approval, the dynamics of the decision making process
37
must change.” The court held that the severance package was too
much of a potential windfall to the executives because it did not
contain a mitigation provision if the executive found work within
38
the six to nine-month period after termination. The court also
opined that the bonuses payable to the executives should be made
39
in the form of stock rather than in cash. With these potential
flaws pointed out, the court denied Geneva’s motion but expressly
left open the possibility that an amended plan would be
30. 236 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999).
31. Id. at 771.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 772.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 773 (“The court finds that to propose this retention program
without first having discussed its provisions with the Steelworkers is not an
example of sound business judgment.”).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 773–74.
39. Id. at 774.
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entertained by the court in the future if the debtor presented
40
one.
b.

In re Aerovox, Inc.

41

Aerovox, Inc. entered Chapter 11 with a goal of finding a
42
buyer for its assets. The debtor proposed a plan that would give
key employees a retention plan bonus of three months’ salary when
the employee was either involuntarily terminated, all of the
43
debtor’s assets were sold, or on June 6, 2002, whichever came first.
The plan also proposed a severance package that included at least a
44
The
payment equal to six months’ salary for the employee.
debtor argued that the plan was necessary to prevent critical
45
employees from leaving the company. However, the Unsecured
Creditors Committee “maintained that the KERP was unnecessary
46
and excessive and was not designed to achieve a particular result.”
The Unsecured Creditors Committee argued that the debtor
should prove that the key personnel whom the debtor was trying to
47
retain were in fact threatening to leave.
The court examined the evidence and applied the business
judgment rule to the debtor’s proposal and its supporting
evidence.
In determining whether to approve the business decision
of a debtor-in-possession or a trustee, the “bankruptcy
court sits as an overseer of the wisdom with which the
bankruptcy estate’s property is being managed by the
trustee or debtor-in-possession, and not, as it does in other
circumstances, as the arbiter of disputes between the
48
creditors and the estate.”
Based upon the facts and circumstances of the proposed plans, the
court deferred to the debtor’s judgment that the retention and
49
As
severance plans were indeed necessary and appropriate.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
1993)).
49.

Id.
269 B.R. 74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 80 (citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.
Id. at 81.
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additional support for its decision, the court also noted that the
objecting unsecured creditors had not produced any evidence that
rebutted the debtor’s evidence that the KERP was an exercise of
50
sound business judgment.
c.

In re Interco Inc.

51

In In re Interco, Inc., the court analyzed the proposed retention
plan, focusing on factors like the necessity of the company to retain
certain employees for a successful reorganization, the current
below-industry standard compensation of the executives, the use of
performance goals as a measure of the amount of the bonus to be
given, the reasonableness of the costs as opposed to the risk to the
entire reorganization without the critical executives, and the use of
52
After examining this
similar plans in other bankruptcies.
evidence, the court found that the debtor’s business judgment was
acceptable and the proposed plan would be confirmed as an
53
exercise of sound business judgment.
d.

In re Allied Holdings, Inc.

54

In In re Allied Holdings, Inc., the debtors, with the support of
the Unsecured Creditors Committee and the secured lenders,
55
proposed a KERP that would benefit four “tiers” of employees.
The plan provided a retention or emergence bonus equal to a
certain percentage of the employee’s annual salary as follows: Tier
1: 75% to 90%; Tier 2: 59.4% to 85%; Tier 3: 35% to 50%; and Tier
56
4: 20% to 25%. The bonuses were to be paid in four installments,
57
There was also an
payable on certain milestones and dates.
additional fund of $150,000 from which the debtor could give
58
discretionary bonuses of not more than $30,000 to an employee.
The KERP, however, was opposed by the union representing the
59
debtors’ employees and the United States Trustee.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 82.
128 B.R. 229 (Bankr. M.D. Mo. 1991).
Id. at 230–32.
Id. at 234.
337 B.R. 716 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).
Id. at 717–18.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 717.
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The court assessed the plan and applied the business
judgment rule, requiring that there be a sound business purpose
60
for the plan and that the plan be fair and reasonable. As the
court stated, “[t]his approach avoids the possibility that the debtor
will have unfettered discretion in devising a plan and also permits
the Court to ‘analyze factors, based on the facts and circumstances
of each case,’ and ‘to tailor the Retention Plan to accomplish
61
necessary goals.’” Because the debtors had sought the advice of
an outside consultant, had secured the unsecured committee’s
participation in the creation of the KERP, and had created a
compensation committee to oversee the formulation of the KERP,
the debtors had clearly used sound business judgment to achieve a
62
reasonable plan.
The court did, however, reduce the bonuses payable to the top
two tiers of employees because “the payment of such large
bonuses . . . at this time would be unfair to the Debtors’ unionized
employees, considering the fact that the parties have indicated that
the Debtors must seek further concessions from the unionized
63
employees .” The court ordered that the KERP be approved with
the caveat that Tier 1 bonuses were not to exceed 75% of annual
salary and Tier 2 bonuses were not to exceed 70% of annual
64
salary.
These cases demonstrate the court’s involvement in the
approval and modification of proposed KERPs. This involvement,
however, was not without its detractors.
5.

Criticisms of KERPs

While the court had the power to and did approve KERPs,
there were several arguments against their availability to debtors.
First amongst these was the simple fact that KERPs were not
necessarily that useful. “There is no evidence that bonus payments
actually result in the retention of employees who would otherwise
leave, and considerable anecdotal evidence in cases with KERPS
65
In addition to their
that they made no material difference.”
60. Id. at 722.
61. Id. (quoting In re Georgetown Steel, LLC, 306 B.R. 549, 556 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2004)).
62. Id. at 722–24.
63. Id. at 725.
64. Id. at 726–27.
65. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV. Keach cites examples from both the
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doubtful utility in retaining employees, KERPs also often have a
66
negative impact on employee morale as a whole. This effect was
67
noted by the court in Geneva Steel, discussed above. In Geneva Steel,
the debtor was chastised by the court for failing to seek the
employee union’s acquiescence to the proposed retention and
bonus plan for senior executives and noted “the depth of the
68
The court denied the
[union’s] opposition” to the KERP.
proposed KERP because it had too many windfall qualities for the
69
benefit of the executives.
Courts have sometimes factored in the disparity between the
salaries earned by a debtor’s executives with the salaries paid to
70
executives in similar, yet financially sound, businesses. But why
should an executive who has seen his company fall into financial
hardship necessarily expect or deserve a “market rate” salary?
The assumption that persons employed by companies in
bankruptcy should receive as much as those not in that
unfortunate state is one of the primary places where
bankruptcy realities run directly counter to the instinctive
views of the rest of the world. When confronted with
economic difficulties outside of bankruptcy, we usually
assume we must spend less on ourselves and cannot afford
71
the same amount of professional assistance.
Yet bankruptcy courts have allowed companies to bolster the pay
packages offered to executives even after those executives have
72
helmed the ship as it was going down.
Another worrisome aspect of KERP implementation is the
court’s deferential standard in examining the need and
reasonableness of the proposed plan. As discussed above, a court
would apply the business judgment rule to determine the

Kmart and Enron bankruptcies, demonstrating that the implementation of a
KERP had very little effect on the number of employees who were leaving the
company on a weekly basis. Id.
66. Id.
67. See supra Part II.A.4.a.
68. In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999).
69. Id. at 773–74.
70. See, e.g., In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Mo. 1991).
71. Karen Cordry & Zachary Mosner, Challenging the “Lake Wobegon Syndrome”:
What Hath Congress Wrought with KERPS?, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2006).
72. See, e.g., In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 82 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001)
(stating that the debtor showed that the KERP was an exercise of sound business
judgment); Interco, 128 B.R. at 234 (stating that the court accepted the debtor’s
business judgment regarding incentive retention programs).
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appropriateness of the proposed KERP. The application of the
business judgment rule in essence meant that the court would
approve the KERP so long as the plan was not “so manifestly
unreasonable that it could not be based on sound business
74
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.” While this
standard may be a good measure for a debtor’s use of its property
75
in arms-length transactions, it is much harder to apply to a plan
that has been negotiated by the same managers and executives who
76
Often the evidence
stand to benefit from its implementation.
provided by the debtor is through the testimony of experts who are
paid by the debtor (and thus by the executives who manage the
77
debtor’s business). For example, in Aerovox, the court relied on
the testimony of two of the debtor’s executives in holding that the
proposed KERP was a sound business judgment on the part of the
78
debtor. Though not necessarily unreliable, such evidence should
perhaps be scrutinized by the court under a less deferential
standard than the business judgment rule.
Finally, KERPs tend to undermine the reputation of the
bankruptcy system as a whole.
KERPS breed a lack of faith in, and a lack of respect for,
the bankruptcy system among creditors and rank and file
employees who cannot grasp how the guys who drove the
bus off the road get bonuses while vendors go unpaid,
retiree benefits are slashed, and other wage-related,
73. See supra Part II.A.3.
74. In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)
(citing Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1047 (4th Cir. 1985)).
75. Section 363 of the United States Code requires court approval of all
transactions in which the debtor proposes to use, sell, or lease any of its property
“other than in the ordinary course of business.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
The bankruptcy courts have created the business judgment rule to determine
when there is sufficient reason or benefit to use the estate property to offset the
immediate loss of the property from the estate. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d
1063, 1071–72 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, in an arms-length transaction, the benefits
and disadvantages to the bankruptcy estate are more clearly delineated.
76. Cordry & Mosner, supra note 71, at 61.
77. See Keach, supra note 13, at Part II (“The supporting ‘evidence’ cited in
the decided cases is generally vague and self-serving . . . . [M]ost of the evidence is
in the form of testimony of insiders (often executives who will benefit from the
KERP) and of HR ‘experts’ who design KERPS. One has to question the reliability
of such evidence.”). See also Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paychecks: Troubling
Conflicts; Outside Advice on Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2006, at A1.
78. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 78–80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
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pension and severance claims remain unsatisfied.
This criticism became more and more obvious as a wave of large
bankruptcies produced newsworthy accounts of huge bonus
packages paid to top executives.
B. After Several Huge, High-Profile Bankruptcies Were Filed, KERPs
Came Into the Public Awareness
Starting in 2001, several high-profile bankruptcy cases entered
80
Along with these high-profile
the public’s awareness.
bankruptcies came news stories detailing the huge retention plans
81
that were proposed by the companies.
The first of these companies to seek a huge retention bonus
82
program was Polaroid Corporation. The debtors asked the court
to allow bonus and incentive payments to about forty-five
83
executives and up to $19 million. These payments would be in
addition to the executives’ receipt of 5% to 6% of the proceeds
84
This proposal, however, was
from a sale of Polaroid’s assets.
strenuously opposed by a group of Polaroid’s retirees and
85
The employees and retirees were incensed at the
employees.
prospect of such a huge payment to Polaroid’s executives after the
company had already laid off thousands and had cut medical and
86
In the end, Polaroid
life insurance benefits for employees.
withdrew its plan in response to the intense pressure from the

79. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV.
80. See Stephen Labaton, Crime and Consequences Still Weigh on Corporate World;
Four Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2006, at C1 (including a chart that provides a timeline of major bankruptcy filings
and the criminal proceedings against many of the major executives of the
bankrupt companies).
81. See Polaroid Seeks to Reward Top Executives with Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at C3; Thomas S. Mulligan, Judge OKs Enron Plan to Retain Senior Workers, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at Business Desk 3; Jennifer LeClaire, Bonuses Amid
Bankruptcy Draw Ire of Axed Workers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 2002, at 14;
James S. Granelli, Global Crossing Offers Bonus Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at
Business Desk 2; Rebecca Blumenstein, WorldCom Judge Approves Plan to Keep
Employees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at B3.
82. See Polaroid Seeks to Reward Top Executives, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Polaroid Retirees Oppose Bonus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001, at C10; see
also Polaroid Withdraws $5 Million Bonus Plan to Retain Executives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2002, at B5 [hereinafter Polaroid Withdraws].
86. Polaroid Withdraws, supra note 85.
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87

employees and retirees.
Enron was the next major bankruptcy to hit the public
88
The debtors quickly moved for and received
consciousness.
judicial approval of a retention bonus plan. “Under the proposal,
about 1,700 employees would share $40 million in retention
bonuses, $7 million in severance payments and from $47.4 million
to $90 million in incentive bonuses based on the amount of cash
89
raised from asset sales.” While these huge amounts raised public
ire, an even more controversial provision of the Enron plan
allowed waivers to be given to certain employees, which allowed
those employees to retain large bonuses just before Enron filed for
90
bankruptcy.
Kmart also implemented a large executive retention bonus
plan. As one reporter pointed out, the disparity between the
treatment of executives and the treatment of rank-and-file
employees was often astounding: “Kmart . . . is awarding retention
bonuses worth $150 million to managers while more than 22,000
workers are sent home without severance, for example, and . . .
Enron is paying $140 million to hold key personnel while cutting
91
about 4,500 jobs.” Public pressure was mounting—“some view it
as ironic that company captains are receiving major money to stay
on board when they are presumably the ones who steered the
92
business into the rocks.” The companies, however, kept the plans
coming even as public scrutiny increased.
In 2002, Global Crossing Ltd. sought bankruptcy court
approval of a retention plan that “would pay nine executive vice
presidents bonuses of up to half of their annual salaries and 295
93
other high level executives up to 27.5% of their pay.” The plan
94
The company would,
would pay out up to $15 million total.
however, also be cutting 16% of its workforce in the reorganization
95
process.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
See Labaton, supra note 80.
Mulligan, supra note 81.
Id.
LeClaire, supra note 81.
Id.
Granelli, supra note 81.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Legislature Took Notice and Acted
As these huge bankruptcies became more common and the
public became aware of these valuable payouts to executives,
Congress attempted to rein in the corporations. The first attempt,
which proved unsuccessful, was the Employee Abuse Prevention
96
Act of 2002.
The Employee Abuse Prevention Act was intended “[t]o
protect employees and retirees from corporate practices that
deprive them of their earnings and retirement savings when a
97
Section 104 of the bill
business files for bankruptcy . . . .”
98
proposed an amendment to section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code.
That amendment would place restrictions on payments made “to
an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to
99
remain with the debtor’s business” on “a severance payment to an
100
insider of the debtor” and on “other transfers or obligations that
are outside the ordinary course of business and not justified by the
101
facts and circumstances of the case.” However, this bill was never
enacted.
In 2005, Congress considered the Bankruptcy Abuse
102
While the bill was
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Kennedy
introduced an amendment to section 503(c) that was extremely
103
similar to section 104 of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act.
The purpose of the amendment was “[t]o expand the authority of
bankruptcy courts to limit retention bonuses and severance pay to
104
corporate insiders.”
Further legislative history about this portion of the bill is
scanty. During the extensive debate on the bill, Senator Kennedy
rose and pointed to the Polaroid Company bankruptcy as an
example of corporate insiders receiving handsome bonuses at the
96. S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).
97. S. 2798; H.R. 5221 (citing the title of the bill).
98. S. 2798 § 104; H.R. 5221 § 104.
99. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(A); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(A).
100. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(B); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(B).
101. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(C); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(C).
102. S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 685, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
103. Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 88 (2007).
See also Amend. No. 5202 to S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005),
http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/amend5202.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
104. Amend. No. 5202 to S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005) (citing the purpose as
listed on the amendment).
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105

expense of the rank and file employees. He went on to say that:
Current law on corporate bankruptcy is grossly
inadequate in dealing with these problems. Often, the
very insiders whose misconduct brought the company
down do very well in bankruptcy. . . . Increasingly, the
bankruptcy court has become a place where corporate
executives go to get permission to line their own pockets
106
and break their promise to their workers and retirees.
Several other times during the debate, large bankruptcies like
Adelphia, Enron, United Airlines, TWA, Kmart, Polaroid, and
107
Global Crossing were mentioned.
108
On March 10, 2005, BAPCPA passed in the Senate.
The
109
House debated on the bill for only one hour. The House passed
110
President Bush signed the bill into law on April
it the same day.
111
20, 2005.
With the passage of BAPCPA, section 503(c) was inserted into
112
the Code. That section is worth setting forth here in full:
§ 503. Allowance of administrative expenses
***

105. 151 CONG. REC. S1979, 1990-91 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
106. Id. at S1990. Senator Kennedy was not alone in his condemnation of the
current state of affairs. Senator Durbin also rose to point out several examples of
corporate insiders receiving huge bonuses:
If I went to Illinois and asked the people I represent what they think we
should do when it comes to bankruptcy, I am virtually certain that the
first thing they would say to me is, you have to do something about these
horrible corporate bankruptcies, Enron, WorldCom, and the list goes on,
and the abuses which these officers and CEOs have demonstrated as
heads of these corporations, the fact that because they were feathering
their own beds when their companies went bankrupt, hurting
shareholders, hurting employees, hurting investors in pension plans, and
hurting retirees. I think my constituents in Illinois are right. When it
comes to bankruptcy, that is the scandal in America.
Id. at S1986.
107. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21, S1818 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. REC. 23 at S1987 (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG.
REC. 23 at S1991 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
108. 151 CONG. REC. 28, S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005). The vote was 74 yeas,
25 nays, and 1 abstention (Sen. Clinton).
109. 151 CONG. REC. 44, H1974 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005).
110. Id. at H1991–92.
111. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
112. Id.
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(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), there shall neither be
allowed, nor paid —
(1) a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the
benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of
inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s
business, absent a finding by the court based on evidence
in the record that—
(A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention
of the person because the individual has a bona fide
job offer from another business at the same or
greater rate of compensation;
(B) the services provided by the person are essential
to the survival of the business; and
(C) either—
(i) the amount of the transfer made to, or
obligation incurred for the benefit of, the person
is not greater than the amount equal to 10 times
the amount of the mean transfer or obligation of
a similar kind given to nonmanagement
employees for any purpose during the calendar
year in which the transfer is made or the
obligation is incurred; or
(ii) if no such similar transfers were made to, or
obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such
nonmanagement employees during such
calendar year, the amount of the transfer or
obligation is not greater than an amount equal
to 25 percent of the amount of any similar
transfer or obligation made to or incurred for
the benefit of such insider for any purpose
during the calendar year before the year in
which such transfer is made or obligation is
incurred;
(2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor,
unless—
(A) the payment is part of a program that is generally
applicable to all full-time employees; and
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10
times the amount of the mean severance pay given to
nonmanagement employees during the calendar year
in which the payment is made; or
(3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts
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and circumstances of the case, including transfers made
to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of, officers,
managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing
113
of the petition.
The language of this section purports to strictly limit payments to
insiders of the debtor, be they bonuses or severance payments. In
practice, however, this purpose has been left to judicial
114
interpretation.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Decisions Since BAPCPA
The bankruptcy court has only had a handful of chances to
apply the new section 503(c) to proposed bonus plans. The
following cases are briefly examined to serve as an overview. The
decisions and the rules that can be gleaned from them are more
closely examined in Part III.B below.
1.

In re Nobex Corp.

115

In re Nobex was one of the first opportunities for the bankruptcy
court to apply the new section 503(c). The debtors were not
reorganizing but were seeking a sale of all of the company’s
116
The debtors proposed a bonus plan for two of its
assets.
117
The plan proposed to pay the managers a bonus
managers.
equal to a percentage of the gross purchase price received for the
sale of the company’s assets, with the applicable percentage
118
increasing as the sale price increased.
The court found that the two managers eligible for the bonus
119
The
packages were critical to the winding-down of the business.
court also found that “[t]he unique skills and expertise of [the
managers] are essential to the Debtor’s successful implementation
of the sale procedures presently proposed by the Debtor and ability
120
When the court
to maximize the value of the Debtor’s assets.”
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2006).
See infra Part III.
No. 05-20050(MFW), 2006 WL 4063024 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 19, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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turned to considering the bonus plan under the new strictures of
section 503(c), the court found that because the plan was incentive121
based, it did not fall into the purview of sections 503(c)(1) or
122
The court then held that section 503(c)(3) did not
(c)(2).
123
Therefore, the court ruled that the
prohibit the proposed plan.
debtors merely had to meet the burden of proof required by
section 363—the business judgment rule—in order to be
124
acceptable. The court held that the debtors had met this burden
125
and thus approved the bonus plan under section 363.
2.

In re Airway Industries, Inc.

126

In In re Airway Industries, Inc., one of the debtor’s secured
lenders wanted to give a bonus to certain employees of the debtor
if the debtor sold all of its assets, either inside or outside of
bankruptcy, and the secured lender received a cash distribution
127
The court held that the proposed bonus was
from that sale.
outside the confines of section 503(c) because the money was not
coming from the debtor; rather, it was coming from an outside
source and was only going to specific employees, not to the debtor
128
129
itself. Thus, there was no risk of diminution of the estate.
3.

In re CEP Holdings, LLC

130

The court in In re CEP Holdings, LLC had previously issued an
oral opinion approving the debtors’ “performance bonus plan” for
131
“all but certain members of the Debtors’ management team.”
The court had disallowed the bonus payments for the President
and CEO and the President of the Board because they were
121. Id. at *3 (finding that the bonus is clearly incentive-based because the
managers are only eligible to receive it if they can achieve a higher gross sale price
than the stalking-horse bid). A “stalking-horse bid” is “[a]n initial bid on a
bankrupt company’s assets from an interested buyer chosen by the bankrupt
company.”
Investopedia, Stalking-Horse Bid, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/stalkinghorsebid.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
122. Nobex, 2006 WL 4063024 at *3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 354 B.R. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
127. Id. at 85.
128. Id. at 87–88.
129. Id. at 88.
130. No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006).
131. Id. at *1.
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132

insiders of the company.
“[T]he Court believed that it was not
possible under Section 503(c)(3) . . . to find that the proposed
payment amounts to these two insiders were, in the language of the
133
Code, justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.”
4.

In re Calpine Corp.

134

In an unpublished order in In re Calpine Corp., the court
granted Calpine’s motion for approval of its “Incentive Program,”
which was made up of an “Emergence Incentive Plan,” a
“Management Incentive Plan,” a “Supplemental Bonus Plan,” and
135
Each of these plans featured
a “Discretionary Bonus Plan.”
bonus payments contingent on the achievement of certain
136
performance goals. While the order did not set forth the court’s
reasoning behind its ruling, it can be assumed that the court
approved the plan under section 503(c)(3).
5.

In re Dana Corp. (“Dana I”)

137

It was not until Dana Corporation proposed its incentive plan
in In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), that the court denied a plan under
section 503(c). The plan proposed by the debtor included base
salary, an annual incentive bonus plan, and “Target Completion
138
The completion bonuses
Bonuses” for each of the executives.
139
The fixed component
had both fixed and variable components.
of the completion bonuses would be “payable in cash on the
effective date of a plan of reorganization” if the executive was still
140
The variable component was based on the
employed by Dana.
“Total Enterprise Value” of the debtor measured six months after
141
This bonus varied based on the level of the
the effective date.
value, but a bonus was still payable even if the debtor’s enterprise
132. Id.
133. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
134. Order Authorizing the Implementation of the Calpine Incentive
Program, No. 05-60200(BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2005), available at
http://www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/calpine%20order%20approving%20in
centive%20plan.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
135. Id. ¶ 2.
136. Id. at Ex. 1.
137. 351 B.R. 96 (Dana I) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
138. Id. at 99.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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142

value decreased a certain percentage.
When the court analyzed the proposed plans, it noted that the
fixed component of the plans could clearly not be categorized as
143
Because a portion of the plan was not tied to
incentive-based.
performance goals, the court held that it fell within section
144
Thus, the
503(c)(1)’s prohibition of retention bonus plans.
court could not approve the plan regardless of whether the debtor
145
had exercised its sound business judgment in proposing it.
6.

In re Dana Corp. (“Dana II”)

146

The Dana executives, however, were not deterred. After the
previous motion for approval of its bonus plan failed, the debtor
modified the plan and negotiated with its creditors to gain their
147
Notably, the court pointed out:
approval of the modified plan.
“The plan before the Court today, unlike the previous iteration,
has no guaranteed payments to the CEO or Senior Executives other
than base salary and is a substantial retreat from the original
148
Because the plan in front of the court was now
proposals.”
clearly based on performance goals and served to incentivize the
149
executives, the plan could be approved under section 503(c).
7.

In re Global Home Products, LLC

150

The debtors in Global Home sought approval of two plans, one
applicable to eligible managers and the other to eligible sales
151
Both plans would only pay bonuses if the company
staff.
achieved certain EBITDAR (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
152
Importantly, the
Depreciation and Rent) and cash flow goals.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 102 (“Without tying [the fixed] portion of the [completion] bonus
to anything other than staying with the company until the Effective Date, this
Court cannot categorize a bonus of this size and form as an incentive bonus.”).
144. See id. (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 503(C) (2006)). The court added, in a now
famous footnote: “If it walks like a duck (KERP) and quacks like a duck (KERP),
it’s a duck (KERP).” Id. at 102 n.3.
145. Id. at 100–01.
146. 358 B.R. 567 (Dana II) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
147. Id. at 571.
148. Id. at 574.
149. Id. at 584 (discussing § 503(C)).
150. 369 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
151. Id. at 780–81.
152. Id.
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court noted that the debtor had offered similar incentive programs
153
prior to filing for bankruptcy.
The court recognized that the new section 503(c) imposed
severe limitations on bonus plans that were intended to retain
154
However, the court also noted that “[t]he entire
employees.
analysis changes if a bonus plan is not primarily motivated to retain
155
Following the
personnel or is not in the nature of severance.”
reasoning of Dana II, the court declared that if the plan was not
retentive in nature, it should be analyzed under the business
156
judgment rule. The court also held that the plans were proposed
in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business, making section
157
503(c) inapplicable.
8.

In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc.

158

Nellson Nutraceutical also dealt with a longstanding employee
159
The debtors had previously implemented a
incentive program.
plan that awarded bonuses based on the company’s achievement of
160
certain financial targets. The court determined that the debtor’s
bonus programs were implemented in the ordinary course of the
161
debtor’s business. Because the plan was in the ordinary course of
business, the court refused to analyze it under the business
162
Instead, the court held that the constraints of
judgment rule.
section 503(c)(3) only apply to transactions made “outside the
ordinary course of business” and thus if a transaction—including
an incentive-based bonus program—is within the ordinary course
163
of business, section 503 will not apply to bar that transaction.
The incentive plans were allowed as a reasonable action within the

153. Id. at 780 n.4.
154. Id. at 785 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 503(C) (2006)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 786.
157. Id.
158. 369 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
159. Id. at 795.
160. Id. at 793.
161. Id. at 797.
162. Id. at 799 (“Because the entire incentive program before the Court in this
case is within the ordinary course of the Debtors’ business judgment, however, the
criteria developed in Dana Corp. for analyzing whether an incentive plan adopted
outside the ordinary course of business is a reasonable exercise of a debtor’s
business judgment are not applicable here.”).
163. Id. at 801 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3) (2006)).
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164

B. What Standards Have Been Created by the Case Law Since BAPCPA
Was Enacted?
While the existing case law interpreting section 503(c) is
currently somewhat sparse, some important standards can be
gleaned from the cases discussed above.
1. If a Plan Is To Be Considered Incentive-Based, What Constitutes
an Incentive?
Most of the cases decided under BAPCPA’s new section 503(c)
have hinged on the idea of an incentive-based retention program
165
rather than an outlawed KERP.
The courts have declared that
this distinction can either make or break the approval of a bonus
166
The incentives
plan for employees of a bankrupt company.
accepted by courts thus far have included giving employees a bonus
if they can secure a higher selling price for the company’s assets
167
or allowing bonuses for
than the current stalking-horse bid
168
employees if the company can exceed specific EBITDAR targets.
As the Dana II court noted, these incentives encourage the eligible
169
employees to “produce and increase the value of the estate . . . .”
The Dana I court was the first to examine section 503(c)
carefully and create some boundaries between retention and
incentive-based plans. In Dana I, the court noted that “section
503(c) establishes specific evidentiary standards that must be met
before a bankruptcy court may authorize payments made to an
insider for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with a
170
debtor’s business, or payments made on account of severance.”
The court cited to sections 503(c)(1) and (2) before declaring that
if a plan falls within the purview of either section, the “Bankruptcy
Code makes it abundantly clear” that such a plan cannot be
164. Id. at 804.
165. See supra Part III.A.
166. See, e.g., In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 785 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007) (“The entire analysis changes if a bonus plan is not primarily motivated to
retain personnel or is not in the nature of severance.”).
167. In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL 4063024, at *2–3 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2006). See also supra note 121 (defining a “stalking-horse bid”).
168. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Global Home, 369 B.R. at 780–81; Nellson Nutraceutical, 369 B.R. at 791–92.
169. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 584.
170. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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allowed even though there may be a “sound business purpose” for
171
Thus, when a court examines a proposed
its implementation.
bonus program, it must first determine if it is impermissible under
sections 503(c)(1) or (2). Although the debtor urged that the
proposed plan did not fall into either of these sections and should
instead be analyzed under section 503(c)(3), the court found that
the proposed plans were not incentive-based and so were not
172
The court did go out of its
allowable under section 503(c)(1).
way to emphasize, though, that bonus plans could be allowed
under section 503(c): “I do not find that incentivizing plans which
may have some components that arguably have a retentive effect,
173
necessarily violate section 503(c)’s requirements.”
It was not until Dana II that the court had an opportunity to
clarify the distinction between retentive and incentivizing bonus
174
First, the court set out a “holistic” approach to
programs.
175
examining a proposed plan.
In general, a plan must be
considered as a whole and the specifics of the plan must be
examined, including:
[W]hether the amount of cost or expense is reasonable
and in the best interest of the estate; whether the services
to be provided are likely to enhance a successful
reorganization or liquidation of the debtor; [and]
whether the debtor exercised proper business judgment
in implementing any application for continuing,
176
resuming, or retaining the executive.
By examining a plan with its entire purpose in mind, as well as
taking into account section 503(c)’s limitations on KERPs and
177
the Dana II court declared that “a true
severance packages,
178
incentive plan may not be constrained by 503(c) limitations.”
Thus, the distinction between a plan that is geared toward
merely retaining employees and a plan that encourages the
employees to meet certain goals becomes paramount to a plan’s
179
success. The Dana II court emphasized that in order for a plan to
171. Id. at 100–01.
172. Id. at 102.
173. Id. at 103.
174. Dana II, 358 B.R. 567.
175. Id. at 571.
176. Id.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1), (2) (2006).
178. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 571.
179. Id. at 575. The Dana II court examined the statute and concluded that
“section 503(c) was not intended to foreclose a chapter 11 debtor from reasonably
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be one that relied on incentives, the plan must be “calculated to
180
The court also noted that
achieve the desired performance.”
factors like an analysis of which employees needed to be
incentivized, what kind of incentives are generally applicable in an
industry, and whether the debtor received independent counsel in
181
creating the incentive plan should also be considered. If a plan is
clearly an incentive plan, even if it may have some retentive impact,
it will be analyzed under section 503(c)(3) and not automatically
subjected to the high evidentiary standards of sections 503(c)(1)
182
and (2).
From these cases, and from Dana I and II in particular, it is
clear that structuring a bonus plan around incentives will make it
much more likely to be approved by the court. Though Congress
may have intended to curtail executive compensation with the
183
implementation of section 503(c), the courts have interpreted
184
A
the statute as written to limit only clearly retentive programs.
bankruptcy court will examine a proposed plan and consider what
kind of performance goals are to be achieved in determining its
185
If those goals are indeed related to the
incentivizing nature.
performance of the employees, then the employees will earn their
186
bonus and the plan will be approved.
2. What Is the Definition of an “Insider” for Purposes of Section
503(c)?
The Code provides a definition of an “insider” in section
compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ for their contribution to the
debtors’ reorganization.” Id. (citing In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL
4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)).
180. Id. at 576.
181. Id. at 577.
182. See id. at 576; In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 787 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007).
183. See infra Part II.C.
184. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 576 (“[S]ection 503(c)(3) gives the court discretion
as to bonus and incentive plans, which are not primarily motivated by retention or
in the nature of severance.”).
185. Id. at 576–77.
186. See MaryJo Bellew & Edith K. Altice, Tackle § 503(c) by Structuring a “MIP”
– And Other Strategies to Have in Your Playbook, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 76–77
(2008). Bellew and Altice point out that “debtors must structure their proposed
insider compensation bonuses and awards around measurable targets or
benchmarks, such as achieving certain EBITDAR, cash flow or sales targets.” Id. at
77. However, it is also important that the selected target is not “so low that
payment will essentially be guaranteed.” Id. at 78.
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188

101. However, the definition is not all that conclusive. Rather,
it is merely a list that includes certain employment positions within
a debtor corporation or people within certain family relationships
189
Thus, an important distinction for section 503(c)
with a debtor.
purposes—whether an employee is an “insider”—can be a hazy
190
area of interpretation for the courts.
Past precedent and legislative history does provide some
direction. “The legislative history of section 101(31) infers that an
‘insider’ is a person or entity with ‘a sufficiently close relationship
with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny
191
In addition,
than those dealing at arm’s length with debtor.’”
case law has also emphasized the position of the employee and
whether or not his position is high enough that he would be
involved in setting the policy or making important decisions for the
192
company.
Since the enactment of BAPCPA, one case has looked squarely
193
In In re CEP
at the use of the term “insider” in section 503.
Holdings, the court emphasized the idea of control in defining who
194
One of the most important
is an insider for 503(c) purposes.
187. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006).
188. Bellew & Altice, supra note 186, at 78.
189. Id. For example, if a debtor is a corporation, insiders of the debtor would
include a director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. § 101(31)(B). In
addition, an insider could be a “managing agent of the debtor.” § 101(31)(F).
190. Marcia L. Goldstein et al., First Day Issues: Key Employees, ALI-ABA Course
of Study, Mar. 29, 2007 (“In light of the recent changes to section 503 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the status of an employee and whether or not an individual is
an ‘insider’ are key elements in developing an employee compensation bonus
program.”).
191. Id. at 9 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Admin. News 5787,
5810).
192. See, e.g., In re NMI Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 357, 369–70 (Bankr. D. Dist. Col.
1995). The court in In re NMI Systems, Inc. held that:
The appropriate test for whether [an employee] was an officer is whether
[the employee] occupied a high position within the corporation making
him active in setting overall corporate policy or performing other
important executive duties . . . . The term “officer” . . . is broader and
includes, for example, those in the collective group exercising overall
authority regarding the debtor’s corporate decisions who, as members of
that insider group, are in a position to exert undue influence over
corporate decisions . . . .
Id. See also 9 AM. JUR. Bankruptcy § 210 (2008).
193. In re CEP Holdings, LLC, No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665, at *1 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006).
194. Id. at *3 (“The Court believes that in the context of Section 503(c)(3),
insider status under the ‘control’ provision of Section 101(31)(B)(iii) should be
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things to know in determining who is an insider when considering
bonus plans is “whether the potential plan recipient had significant
input into the negotiation of the plan (including the amount of
additional compensation that the employee would receive under
195
It is important to note, however, that the title of an
the plan).”
196
employee is not itself determinative of insider status; a court must
look at the entirety of the employee’s status and responsibilities in
197
order to determine his insider or non-insider status.
3. What Is the Standard for Approving Plans Under Section
503(c)(3)?
Section 503(c)(3) forbids payments “that are outside the
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts and
198
The section is otherwise silent
circumstances of the case . . . .”
about when a payment would be “justified by the facts and
circumstances” of a case. Courts, therefore, have interpreted this
language to simply be a reiteration of the business judgment rule
already used by bankruptcy courts in applying other sections of the
199
In particular, the Dana II court declared that section
Code.
503(c)(3) called for no different determination than whether the
debtor’s proposed bonus plan met the “sound business judgment”
200
test.
4. How Have the Courts Applied the Business Judgment Rule to
Proposed Bonus Plans Since BAPCPA?
The “business judgment rule” is just what its name implies—it
determined, at least in part, by reference to the payment recipient’s control of the
specific transaction under consideration and the impact of that transaction upon
the debtor’s creditors.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. at *1.
197. See Craig A. Christensen, Key Employee Retention Plans (“KERPS”) Under the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Amendments (“BAPCPA”),
Am. Bankr. Inst., Feb. 14, 2008. Christensen points out that “many individuals
bear the nomenclature of ‘officer,’ such as vice-president, but a careful
examination of the official corporate records will show no action by the board of
directors actually making these individuals an officer of the corporation. Without
official board action it is unlikely that they qualify as ‘officers.’” Id.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3) (2006).
199. See Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3. Courts have used sections 363(b)
and 105(a) as the basis of the business judgment rule. Id. For further discussion
of the business judgment rule, see supra Part II.A.4 and infra Part III.C.
200. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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requires a bankruptcy judge to weigh the evidence presented to
determine whether the debtor has exercised sound judgment
before the judge may approve the debtor’s proposed course of
201
action. In the case of approving KERPs, courts also required that
202
the debtor’s proposed plan was “fair and reasonable.”
While BAPCPA may have effectively outlawed KERPs, courts
have still approved incentive-based bonus plans under section
203
503(c)(3) by applying the business judgment rule. The factors to
be considered in applying the business judgment rule were
reiterated in Dana II:
Courts consider the following in determining if the
structure of a compensation proposal and the process for
developing the proposal meet the “sound business
judgment” test:
• Is there a reasonable relationship between the plan
proposed and the results to be obtained, i.e., . . . is
the plan calculated to achieve the desired
performance?
• Is the cost of the plan reasonable in the context of
the debtor’s assets, liabilities and earning potential?
• Is the scope of the plan fair and reasonable; does it
apply to all employees; does it discriminate
unfairly?
• Is the plan or proposal consistent with industry
standards?
201. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (C.A.N.Y. 1983). The Lionel
court interpreted section 363 of the Code, which allows a judge to authorize the
use, sale, or lease of the debtor’s property “other than in the ordinary course of
business . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006). See also In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[F]or the debtor-in-possession or trustee to
satisfy its fiduciary duty to the debtor, creditors and equity holders, there must be
some articulated business justification for using, selling, or leasing the property
outside the ordinary course of business.”) (citing Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071).
Coupled with the business justification is also a rebuttable presumption that the
debtor has acted in good faith in proposing the course of business. In re
Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The business judgment
rule ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”) (quoting Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)).
202. In re Allied Holdings, Inc., 337 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). See
also Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3.
203. In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); Dana
II, 358 B.R. 567, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050,
2006 WL 4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
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•

What were the due diligence efforts of the debtor
in investigating the need for a plan; analyzing
which key employees need to be incentivized; what
is available; what is generally applicable in a
particular industry?
• Did the debtor receive independent counsel in
performing due diligence and in creating and
204
authorizing the incentive compensation?
Thus, in general, courts will look at a proposed incentive-based
bonus plan and consider these factors in determining whether the
choice to implement the plan is a sound business judgment. In
reality, however, the business judgment rule comes with a very
205
deferential treatment of the debtor’s decisions, so this test may
not be so difficult to pass.
C. Applying the Business Judgment Rule Through Section 503(c)(3) Has
Allowed Debtors to Continue to Offer Bonus Plans Only Slightly Different
from Pre-BAPCPA KERPs
Section 503(c)(1) was intended—and has been interpreted—
to preclude a debtor from offering key employee retention
206
207
programs. Indeed, some commentators have criticized this ban
and expressed fear that the requirements in section 503(c)(1) were
208
209
impossible to meet and contrary to the Code’s overall policy.
204. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 576–77.
205. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (stating that a
debtor’s business decision “should be approved by the court unless it is shown to
be ‘so manifestly unreasonable that it could not be based upon sound business
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.’”) (citing In re Logical
Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)).
206. Global Home, 369 B.R. at 785 (“The statute makes it abundantly clear that
in a post-BAPCPA bankruptcy case, KERPs and severance arrangements subject to
review under § 503(c)—those whose purpose is to retain employees—are severely
restricted.”); In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 100–01 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“The recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code makes it abundantly
clear that, to the extent a proposed transfer falls within sections 503(c)(1) or
(c)(2), then the business judgment rule does not apply, irrespective of whether a
sound business purpose may actually exist.”).
207. David Crapo, Changes to Key Retention Plans: Amendments Significantly
Modified the Treatment of Severances and Bonuses, 187 N.J.L.J. 173, 173 (2007) (“The
new § 503(c) eliminates much of the discretion that debtors had previously
enjoyed in implementing KERPs and severance plans and that bankruptcy courts
enjoyed in evaluating and approving them.”).
208. See Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter
11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 620–21 (2005); Revich, supra note
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However, solace can now be found in the bankruptcy court’s
interpretation of section 503(c)(3) and its willingness to work
around section 503(c)(1)’s feeble roadblock to allowing debtors to
offer bonuses to their employees.
Nobex was the first case in which the court declared that an
210
incentive-based plan was not the same as a retention plan.
Because it was incentive-based, the plan did not fall into the
purview of section 503(c)(1) and section 503(c)(3) did not
211
prohibit incentive-based pay to employees. Thus, the first inkling
of how to avoid the anti-KERP provisions was blotted into
precedent.
Following Nobex, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York heard a motion to approve debtor
212
With no
Calpine Corporation’s incentive program.
memorandum explaining the decision, the court granted the
debtor’s motion in a bench order and approved an incentive
program consisting of an “Emergence Incentive Plan,”
“Management Incentive Plan,” “Supplemental Bonus Plan,” and
213
Payments under the Emergence
“Discretionary Bonus Plan.”
Incentive Plan and Management Incentive Plan were contingent
214
upon an employee’s achievement of certain performance targets.
The Supplemental Bonus Plan, interestingly, was a retention-type
215
program but was written to exclude the debtor’s “insiders.”
216
However, no definition of an “insider” was provided. Finally, the
Discretionary Bonus Plan was simply a $500,000 pool from which
could be distributed, at the sole discretion of the CEO, bonus

103, at 95; Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J.
451, 457 (2007).
209. Ira L. Herman, Statutory Schizophrenia and the New Chapter 11, 2 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 30, 30 (2007) (“The uncertainty, delay and added expense that may be
engendered by these BAPCPA provisions could be particularly nettlesome if the
courts are to move reorganization cases more quickly through the bankruptcy
system to give effect to the second policy imperative embedded in BAPCPA
chapter 11 provisions: ‘the need for speed.’” (citation omitted)).
210. In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL 4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006).
211. Id.
212. See Order Authorizing the Implementation of the Calpine Incentive
Program, supra note 134.
213. Id. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.
214. Id. at Ex. 1.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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payments of up to $25,000 per employee per year. No reference
218
was made to section 503(c) in the order.
Dana I succeeded Calpine in the bonus plan hunt, and the
219
The court,
debtors urged the court to follow the Calpine lead.
however, paused to examine the plans proposed by the debtor and
220
found that the plans themselves were not truly incentive-based.
The sticking point was that the plans proposed involved some
“fixed” payments that would be made to an employee simply
because he had remained at the company until the “effective date
221
Thus, the court brought section
of a plan of reorganization.”
503(c)(1) into play and held that this non-incentivizing—or
222
retention—plan could not be approved. The court did, however,
go out of its way to leave the door open for truly incentive-based
223
bonus plans.
The door being left wide open, Dana Corp. adjusted its plan
and tried again to cross the threshold. With a slightly different
plan laid before it, the court declared it to be properly incentive224
Following the Nobex and Calpine lead, the court applied
based.
section 503(c)(3) to the plan in order to determine if it should be
225
As section 503(c)(3) really requires “no more
authorized.
226
“section
stringent a test than” the business judgment rule,
503(c)(3) gives the court discretion as to bonus and incentive
plans, which are not primarily motivated by retention or in the
227
The plans were authorized as reasonable
nature of severance.”
228
business judgments on the part of the debtors.
These cases make it clear that bonus plans can be approved
when they are incentive-based and are proper exercises of the
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 101–02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). In
fact, both the Calpine and Dana motions were heard and decided by the same
judge, Judge Burton R. Lifland.
220. Id. at 102.
221. Id. at 99.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 103.
224. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
225. Id. at 576; see also id. at 584 (“By presenting an executive compensation
package that properly incentivizes the CEO and Senior Executives to produce and
increase the value of the estate, the Debtors have established that section
503(c)(1) does not apply to the Executive Compensation Motion.”).
226. Id. at 576.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 584.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6

2009]

NO REST FOR CONGRESS, NO MORE FOR EXECS

1225

debtor’s business judgment. There is, however, another avenue
toward approval of bonus plans that seems to circumvent section
503(c) entirely.
This route began to take shape in Global Home. In that case the
229
court did find that the bonus plan was properly incentive-based.
However, the plan in question was not a “new” plan; a nearly
identical plan had been previously implemented by the company
230
Thus, because the plan was not
before filing for bankruptcy.
new, the court held that it was “clearly in the ordinary course of
231
[the debtor’s] business.” The court then went on to declare that
“[t]he Court is fully satisfied on the basis of the facts presented that
[the debtor is] asking it to approve incentive, not retention plans
232
and, therefore, section 503(c) does not come into play.”
In one
fell swoop, the court simply removed section 503(c) from
consideration, but it is unclear from the decision if this was because
the plan was incentivizing or because the plan was in the debtor’s
ordinary course of business.
Nellson Nutraceutical more clearly defined the path for avoiding
section 503(c) altogether. The debtors in that case had used
incentive-based bonus programs for several years prior to filing for
233
The court found the debtor’s plan to be in the
bankruptcy.
234
ordinary course of the debtor’s business.
As a beginning rule, the court held that “if the Court
determines that a transaction is in the ordinary course of a debtor’s
business, the Court will not entertain an objection to the
235
However, the court did note that section
transaction . . . .”
503(c)(1) does not apply only to transactions outside of the
236
By its plain language section
ordinary course of business.
503(c)(1) applies to any transfer that is “for the benefit of, an
insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to
237
remain with the debtor’s business.” Thus, creditors can still raise
objections under this section and can argue that a proposed bonus

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 786 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787.
In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 795 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 800–01 (quoting § 503(c)(1)(2006)).
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plan is retentive in nature and thus barred by section 503(c)(1).
However, the constraints of section 503(c)(3) only apply to
239
transactions made “outside the ordinary course of business” and
thus, if a transaction—including an incentive-based bonus
program—is within the ordinary course of business, section 503 will
240
Simply put, if a debtor can show
not apply to bar that payment.
that a bonus program is within the ordinary course of its business,
and that bonus program is not retentive in nature, section 503 will
not come into play at all. It is merely up to the court to determine
whether or not the plan is a sound exercise of the debtor’s business
241
judgment under Code section 363.
If a company is capable of doing a little pre-bankruptcy
planning, this avenue may be useful for implementing bonus
242
programs. As one commentator put it: “If the plan is part of the
ordinary course of business of the debtor and the industry, there
should be little concern that the motive is traditional incentive and
243
not primarily post-bankruptcy retention.”
D. Judicial Interpretation of Section 503(c) Has Begun, but Questions
and Flaws Still Remain in the Statute
While courts have interpreted and applied section 503(c) in a
handful of cases, there is some language in the section that has yet
to be addressed. Boldly stated, “[t]he language of § 503(c) is not
244
For instance, section 503(c)(1) restricts
well drafted . . . .”
payments to an insider “for the purpose of inducing such person to
245
The meaning of this phrase is not given anywhere in
remain.”
the Code. If we take the everyday meanings of the words
“purpose,” “induce,” and “remain” into consideration, section
238. See id. at 801 (stating that section 503(c)(1) is applicable “provided that
the payments under the bonus program are to ‘an insider of the debtor for the
purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s business.’”).
239. § 503(c)(3).
240. Nellson Nutraceutical, 369 B.R. at 801.
241. Id. at 804. See also Bellew, supra note 186, at 78 (recommending that
debtors propose plans that will be considered within the “ordinary course” of their
business).
242. See Crapo, supra note 207, at 173 (“Section 503(c) clearly creates a strong
incentive for debtors to characterize or structure [bonus plan] payments
obligations to the insider, as something other than either retention or severance
payments.”).
243. Christensen, supra note 197, at 157.
244. Revich, supra note 103, at 94.
245. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2006).
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503(c)(1) could be read to mean “payments to an insider are
prohibited if they are set up in order to persuade or influence that
246
But this reading still
person to stay with the same company.”
gives us no reference point as to the length of time an employee
247
must “remain” with the company, nor does it tell us if the
“purpose” involved must be the sole purpose behind the
248
payments.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to truly achieve the goal Congress set in passing
section 503(c), several changes should be implemented. First, the
section itself should be modified to make its provisions more
249
Second, further limitations should be placed upon the
clear.
250
bonuses available, even those that are not retention-based.
Finally, bankruptcy judges should be encouraged to take a closer
look at all proposed bonus plans and should use their inherent
251
powers to ensure that bonuses are necessary and reasonable
without deferring too much to the business judgment of the
252
debtor.
A. How Should Section 503(c) Be Changed to End Unnecessary Bonuses
or to Reduce the Size of the Bonuses?
The goal of the legislature is clear—section 503(c) was
intended to curtail the massive bonuses being paid to executives
253
when the companies they helmed were driven into bankruptcy.
While this intent has been followed by the judges interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code, section 503(c) could be clarified and its
requirements tightened by implementing the following
suggestions.

246. Hage, supra note 9, at Part IV.B.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Infra Part IV.A.
250. Infra Part IV.B.
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). This section, entitled “Power of court,”
states that: “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” Id.
252. See supra Part III.C.
253. See supra Part II.C.
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1. Implement Procedural Limitations on Motions for and Approval
of Incentive Programs
Among bankruptcy petitioners, there are certain motions that
254
are referred to as “first day” motions. Among these is the motion
255
By filing these motions
to approve employee bonus plans.
contemporaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition
256
itself, the debtors give the creditors and other interested parties
very little time to scrutinize the proposed plans before the issue is
decided.
In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, Richard
Levin of the National Bankruptcy Conference proposed
implementing procedural limitations on the timing of motions for
257
approval of bonus plans. He suggested that:
A reasonable minimum notice period should be imposed
to allow a creditors’ committee to be formed and to
provide the committee and other parties a fair
opportunity for review of the proposed program, and, if
agreement is not reached, for there to be a fair
258
opportunity for the parties to be heard before the court.
Indeed, the cases interpreting section 503(c) have already
found the agreement or disagreement of the creditors’ committees
and other creditors to be an important factor for consideration. In
Dana I the court noted that “[t]he plan generated extensive
259
However, in Dana II the court noted with approval
opposition.”
that the debtor had modified its plan and had negotiated with
260
many of its creditors to gain approval of the modified plan.
Allowing the creditors to have input on the proposed bonus plans
will decrease the possibility that the plan overreaches and allows
254. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Early Case Motions: First-Day Orders: KERPS; Critical
Vendors, Oct. 5, 2007 [hereinafter Early Case Motions]. Examples of common firstday motions include motions on the effect of the bankruptcy filing on a debtor’s
operations, motions that address the debtor’s relationships with its employees,
creditors and customers, and motions relating to additional financing that the
debtor intends to seek after the bankruptcy filing. Id.
255. Id.; see also Goldstein et al., supra note 190, at 4–10.
256. Early Case Motions, supra note 254.
257. Executive Compensation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases: How Much Is Too
Much?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 22 (2007) [hereinafter “Levin Testimony”]
(testimony of Richard Levin, Esq.).
258. Id. at 26.
259. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
260. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 571–72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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261

2. Create a Strict Definition of Which Employees Constitute
“Insiders” for the Purposes of Section 503(c)
The term “insider” is a somewhat flexible concept in
bankruptcy law. The only major case dealing with the definition is
NMI Systems, Inc. v. Pillard, which held that:
[T]he appropriate test for whether [the employee] was an
officer is whether [the employee] occupied a high
position within the corporation making him active in
setting overall corporate policy or performing other
important executive duties of such a character that it is
likely that he would be accorded less than arm’s-length
treatment in the payment of his antecedent claim against
262
the debtor. . . .
While this decision does give some guidance, a definition this openended can lead to substantial disagreement and litigation.
Levin also proposed amending section 503(c) to tighten up
the definition of insider so as to remove any doubt regarding whom
263
Instead of requiring a factual
the section should apply to.
determination in each case, the insider designation should be
264
Specifically, Item 402(a) of
modeled on the SEC Regulations.
SEC Regulation S-K requires a corporation to disclose the
compensation received by the three most highly compensated
265
Limiting the insider definition to these
executive officers.
individuals, Levin argues, allows a debtor to “offer the incentives
necessary to keep key middle managers and star performers
focused on their jobs, without generating expensive, time266
consuming, and distracting litigation.” This limitation would also
exclude an important or high-powered employee who may have
261. See Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 26 (participation by all involved
parties is more likely to lead to “the negotiation of reasonable and balanced
solutions.”).
262. 179 B.R. 357, 369–70 (Bankr. D.C. 1995) (quoted in In re CEP Holdings,
LLC, No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006)).
For a detailed analysis of NMI Systems, see Brad B. Erens, New Section 503(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code – Who Is an “Officer” Under the KERP Amendment?, 2 No. 11 ANDREWS
BANKR. LITIG. REP. 2 (2005).
263. Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 22, 26.
264. Id. at 26.
265. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (2008). The “three most highly compensated”
individuals does not include the PEO and PFO. Id.
266. Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 26.
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control over some aspect of the debtor’s business, but who has no
input into the level of compensation given to himself or to other
267
employees.
This definition, however, may be somewhat narrow for the
268
As discussed
purposes that section 503(c) intended to achieve.
above, Congress enacted section 503(c) in response to the
bankruptcies of several large corporations and the wealthy
executive compensation packages that were proposed and
269
As the law currently stands, rather than focusing on
approved.
the specific executives defined by SEC Regulation, “a court may
determine that officers of a debtor for purposes of new Section
503(c) are only those senior employees of the debtor who have
significant influence or input with respect to the design of the
270
Creating a definition of the term
debtor’s [bonus plan] . . . .”
“insider” that takes into account the individuals involved with the
bonus plan creation process may help courts apply the standards of
503(c) uniformly and justly in many different circumstances.
B. What Additional Limitations Should Be Put on Incentive Plans in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies?
Merely implementing procedural limits or fiddling with the
language of section 503(c) is not the only way to improve the
process of approving bonus plans or to narrowly tailor the use of
bonus plans to those circumstances where they are necessary and
reasonable. For the reasons explained below, Congress should
continue to examine the use of bonus plans and should consider
other limitations on their amounts, recipients, and requirements.
First, there is no solid evidence that KERPs or incentive-based
programs actually contribute to the successful reorganization of a
271
Robert Keach highlighted this
company in Chapter 11.
267. Id.
268. See Erens, supra note 262.
269. See id. For example, the Polaroid bankruptcy was discussed in the debates
on the Senate floor several times. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 23 S1990 (daily ed. Mar.
3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Erens suggests that “[t]he resulting KERP
amendment introduced by Kennedy, then, might be seen as a reaction to what
some perceived as abuse of power by senior management at Polaroid.” Erens,
supra note 262. See also supra Part II.C.
270. Erens, supra note 262.
271. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV. Keach notes that the bankruptcy of
Kmart as an example of a company that had obtained a KERP for key employees
only to have many of those covered employees leave the company anyway. Id.
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shortcoming even before BAPCPA was enacted: “There is no
evidence that bonus payments actually result in the retention of
employees who would otherwise leave, and considerable anecdotal
evidence in cases with KERPs that they made no material
272
Keach goes on to cite to human resource experts
difference.”
who have pointed out that money is often not a critical factor in
273
retaining employees. If money is not a critical factor, why should
a debtor throw it at employees who may already want to leave?
One of the strongest arguments against KERPs and bonus
programs may be that when bonuses are paid to already highly
274
All
compensated executives, employee morale can be easily lost.
too often in business bankruptcies, the rank and file employees are
asked to sacrifice wages, benefits, and working conditions while the
executives—who were in charge when the finances started to get
shaky—are offered bonuses and incentives to remain at the
275
company. The results of such proposals can be disastrous for the
company.
276
This effect was obvious in Geneva Steel.
In that case, the
debtor proposed a large bonus program for key executives, arguing
277
However,
that the plan was within its sound business judgment.
the court noted that “[w]hile there is evidence that retention of the
key employees is critical to Geneva’s survival, there is also evidence
that granting the Motion as prayed may jeopardize the continuing
278
support of the Steelworkers in Geneva’s reorganization process.”
The loss of union support would mean the loss of the foundational
workforce of the company. Thus, the court denied the motion and
encouraged the debtor to rework the plan and to take the concerns
272. Id. at Part III.
273. Id. at Part IV.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Executive Compensation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases: How Much
Is Too Much?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 14–17 (2007) (testimony of Antoinette
Muoneke). Ms. Muoneke’s prepared statement detailed the pay cuts, longer
hours, and loss of benefits she suffered after the bankruptcy of her employer,
United Airlines. Id. at 15–17. She also expressed her anger at enduring these
losses while at the same time United’s “CEO used the bankruptcy laws to take pay,
bonuses and stock equaling over 1000 times” her compensation and received a
bonus of “125% of his annual salary.” Id. at 17.
276. In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999).
277. Id. at 772. This case was decided pre-BAPCPA and involved a true KERP;
this does not limit the similar effect incentive-based bonus plans can have on
employee morale in post-BAPCPA bankruptcies.
278. Id. at 773.
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279

of the union into account. It is obvious from this case that overly
generous bonus plans can cause havoc for the executives who
propose them.
Finally, these large bonuses also have a detrimental effect on
the perception of the bankruptcy system by the public at large. For
example, one newspaper report began with the following:
A company files for bankruptcy, thousands of workers lose
their jobs and the stock price becomes nearly worthless.
So what do its executives and managers do? They ask for
bonuses, sometimes worth millions of dollars. Never
mind cost-cutting in every other part of the business.
Never mind tough economic times that make it less likely
280
key employees will flee to other jobs.
Executive compensation itself has become a hot topic in the
281
American media and the approval of excessive bonuses continues
to raise the ire of the public. Thus, further caps should be placed
on the amounts available for bonuses and on the executives eligible
to receive them.
C. Bankruptcy Judges Have the Power to Stem the Tide of These Large
Bonuses and Should Do So More Often
Even without specific Congressional action, the bankruptcy
court has the inherent power to rein in any overblown bonus plan.
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title. No provision of this title providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent
282
an abuse of process.
The equitable powers of the bankruptcy court should be brought to
bear on motions for large bonuses. This power allows a judge to
“look through form to the substance of a transaction and devise

279.
280.

Id. at 774.
Rachel Beck, Greed or Need? Big Bonuses During Bankruptcy, TELEGRAPHHERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Jan. 26, 2003, at D3.
281. See supra Part II.B. and note 1.
282. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
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283

new remedies where those at law are inadequate.” Judges should
not feel required to adhere to a presumption of reasonableness
under the business judgment rule when examining these
284
Instead, a court should feel free to analyze the bonus
programs.
plans before them and raise any objections and concerns on their
285
own prerogative.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of KERPs and bonuses is not a new one in
bankruptcy. However, this issue is now part of the larger, more
286
noticeable, public awareness of executive compensation.
Congress has attempted to make changes, but these changes have
not yet completely addressed the issue. More will have to be done
before section 503 is clearly stated, uniformly interpreted, and
successful in its purpose.

283. In re Chinichian v. Campolongo, 784 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted).
284. Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Comment, Toward an Understanding of the
Dialectical Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans During
Bankruptcy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 589 (2004) (“Case law has defined the business
judgment rule as ‘a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
285. Id. at 588.
286. See supra note 1.
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